

GOA STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION

Kamat Towers, seventh Floor, Patto, Panaji, Goa

Shri Prashant S. P. Tendolkar,
State Chief Information Commissioner

Appeal No.198/2018/CIC

Claude Alvares,
G-8, St. Brittos Appts,
Feira Alta,
Mapusa Bardez,
Goa-403507.

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Appellant

V/s

1)The Public Information Officer,
Goa State Pollution Control Board,
Patto, Panaji,Goa-403001

2)The First Appellate Authority,
Goa State Pollution Control Board,
Patto, Panaji,
Goa-403001.

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Respondents.

Filed on: 13/08/2018

Disposed On: 27/08/2019

1) FACTS IN BRIEF:

a) The facts in brief as put forth by the appellant are that by his application, dated 16/04/2018 filed u/s 6(1) of The Right to Information Act 2005 (**Act** for short) sought from the Respondent No.1, PIO copy of the legal opinion received by the Goa State Pollution control Board (GSPCB) in connection with withdrawals of show cause notices issued to 23 mining units granted environmental clearance under EIA notification 1994.

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b) The said application was replied on 19/04/2018 rejecting the said request on the ground that the information sought was exempted from disclosure u/s 8(1)(e) of the act as the same is held in fiduciary capacity.

c) As the appellant could not receive the information as was sought, he filed first appeal to the respondent no.2, being the first Appellate Authority (**FAA**).

d) The FAA by order, dated 14/06/2018 dismissed the said appeal and upheld the decision of the PIO. According to appellant, FAA has not considered the submission and precedents filed by appellant and hence the said order is erroneous. The appellant has therefore landed before this commission in this second appeal u/s 19(3) of the act.

e) Notices were issued to the parties, pursuant to which they appeared. The PIO on 23/11/2018 filed her reply to the appeal. The FAA also filed its reply in the appeal on 23/11/2018. Arguments of the parties, were heard. In addition to oral submissions, appellant, P.I.O. and FAA also filed the synopsis of their submissions in writing. Appellant was represented by Adv. Anamika Gode whereas the respondent no.2 was represented by Adv. A. Kuncoliekar with Adv. Ram Kakkar. PIO Smt. Natalia Dias appeared in person.

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2. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

a) By narrating the sequence of events, it is submitted on behalf of appellant that the concept of public interest underlies the entire Act. Unless the disclosure of information falls within the limited exceptions encumbered in Section 8, disclosure is mandatory and such exceptions are to be construed strictly, not liberally. According to Adv. Gode, the Act even calls for voluntary disclosure of information from authorities, in order to further transparency in the manner of public authorities, responsible public resources.

By relying on the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Reserve Bank of India Vs Jayantilal N Mistry* she submitted that a fiduciary relationship as “a relationship in which one person is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other on the matters within the scope of the fiduciary relationship” and thus, in a fiduciary relationship, there is one party who acts as the fiduciary and another as the beneficiary whose interests the fiduciary is duty bound to protect. The words “information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship” in Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act relates only to information held in a fiduciary capacity and not all information exchanged in a fiduciary relationship. While admitting that there exists a fiduciary relationship between the GSPCB and the Advocate General's office such protection given to

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the information held by the fiduciary and the information held by the beneficiary is significantly different. While there exists a 'legal bar' on disclosure of information that is provided by the beneficiary to a fiduciary as the information is held in trust and cannot be shared with anyone to protect the interest of the beneficiary. There is no such 'legal bar' on disclosure of information that is held by the beneficiary.

By relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in *Central Board of Secondary Education V/S Aditya Bandopadhyay* (2011) 8 SCC 497, Adv. Gode submitted that the exemption under Sec. 8(1)(e) is to apply only to the person who acts in a fiduciary capacity and such exemption cannot extend to the beneficiary and as the beneficiary in this case being a statutory body, is obligated to disclose any information that concerns the public under the RTI Act.

By referring to section 126 and 129 of The Indian Evidence Act, it is submitted on behalf of appellant that Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, prohibits only a lawyer from disclosing any communication which has been made to him by his client in the course and for the purpose of his employment as well as any advice which has been given by the lawyer to his client. In case of private entity, the beneficiary exercise discretion on whether or not he wishes to disclose the

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information. However, such discretion cannot apply to a public authority like GSPCB. In this case, as the citizen have a fundamental right to information that affects the public at large, it is obligated by law to disclose the information sought by the appellant and unlike regular clients in a lawyer-client relationship, the GSPCB does not have a choice to not disclose information in its possession.

It is further according to Adv. Gode that even if the information is held in fiduciary relationship by the fiduciary, it can be disclosed if such disclosure is in public interest. The RTI Act, 2005 empowers the competent authority to examine whether in view of the larger public interest, information protected under the sub clause should be disclosed. According to her in present case information sought is regarding the withdrawal of show cause notices that were issued to 23 mining units in the State of Goa. The client in fact is a statutory authority dealing with the implementation of environment norms which directly affects the appellant and his fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The disclosure of such information is in the interest of the public as public authorities, such as the GSPCB, are accountable to the public for the decisions taken by them and has to justify that their decision was taken without violation of Law. According to Adv. Gode GSPCB has a statutory duty towards the public and must always act to

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protect public interest and hence the legal opinion provided to the GSPCB with regard to the mining leases cannot be said to be in the 'interest of the GSPCB' as stated by the FAA. According to her the citations which are relied upon by the PIO and FAA are not applicable to the present case.

b) The Respondent No.1, PIO also filed her written submissions. While opposing the appeal and praying for dismissal, it is her case that it is settled law that what the Law prevents directly one cannot be permitted to do the same indirectly. If one proceeds by what the Appellant has stated, then while the RTI Act exempts under Section 8 (1) (e) would be rendered meaningless and redundant. According to PIO, the object behind S.8 (1) (e) is to protect the information because it is furnished in confidence and trust reposed. It serves public purpose and ensures that the confidence, trust and the confidentiality attached is not betrayed and this is the public interest which the exemption under Section 8 (1) (e) is designed to protect in such view of things.

By referring to the judgment in the case of *CBSE v/s Aditya Bandopadhyay* reported in (2011) (8) SCC 497 it is the contention of PIO that information in a fiduciary relationship cannot be extended to examinee's answer sheet of which he was the author but details of examiners were held to be covered in a Fiduciary Relationship and

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accordingly the exemption from disclosure was upheld. That said judgment is directly applicable to the facts of the case and there cannot be any disclosure of information when there exists a fiduciary relationship between a lawyer and a Client. By further relying on the case of *Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vs. Shaunak Satya* (**AIR 2011 SC 3336**) it is submitted that the entire basis of relationship between a Lawyer and Client is fiduciary relationship that exists between them the PIO has also relied on the case of *Union of India vs. Subhash Chandra Agarwal* passed by Delhi High Court in support of her contention that Office of Attorney General of India is exempted from disclosure.

c) The respondent No.2 i.e. the FAA also filed its written submissions. Said submissions are in the nature of further elaboration of the argument as put forth by the PIO, who is the respondent No.1 herein. I therefore refrain from reproducing the same to avoid repetition.

d) The appellant filed an affidavit on 17/5/2019 wherein he relied upon the order dated 14/10/2016 passed by this Commission in Appeal No.15/SCIC/2014 in support of his contentions. Said affidavit is dealt with by FAA vide his additional submissions. To distinguish the ratio in the said Appeal No.15/SCIC/2014, Adv.

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Kunkoliekar for FAA has relied upon the Judgment in the case of *Subhash Chandra Agarwal V/s Attorney General of India* passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi.

3) FINDINGS:

a) Perused the records. In the course of proceedings it was noted that the FAA after notifying as a party has tried to justify its order passed in First appeal No.05/2018 filed by the appellant herein. In view of the same the locus of FAA to support its order was also required to be considered. In the written submissions the FAA, i.e. the respondent No.2 herein has tried to justify its locus in contesting the present appeal. In support of his said contention he has relied upon the *Right to Information Rules 2012, notified by Central Government* and has made a specific reference to Rule 11 thereof.

It needs mention that such rules are framed in exercise of the powers granted to appropriate Government which in the present case is the State of Goa. Section 27 of the act clarifies that for the purpose of present proceedings before the State Information Commission, the rules are required to be framed by State Government. Thus the rules as framed by State of Goa would apply herein. I therefore find that the reliance of FAA on Central Rules is misconceived.

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Be that as it may, even the rules framed by the State of Goa does not support the said contention of FAA. **Rule (5) of GSIC Appeal Procedure Rules 2006** provides discretion to the Commission to seek assistance from several authorities/person. Said Rule reads:

*“5. Procedure in deciding appeal.- In deciding an appeal, the Commission **may**,-*

vi) take oral or written evidence on oath or on affidavit from the concerned or interested person;

ii) peruse or inspect documents, public records or copies thereof;

(iii) inquire, through authorized officer, about further details or facts;

iv) hear State Public Information Officer, State Assistant Public Information Officer or such Senior Officer who had decided the first appeal, or such person against who had decided the first appeal, or such person against whom the complaint is made, as the case may be;

v) hear a third party; and

vi) receive evidence on affidavits from State Public Information Officer, State Assistant Public Information Officer, such Senior

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Officer who decided the first appeal, such person against whom the complaint lies or the third party.

The word "May" as used therein clearly indicates that the Commission has the discretion to seek assistances as listed at (i) to (vi) therein. Said rule does not grant any authority to support its order before Commission.

b) It is further to be noted that the FAA is a quasi judicial authority constituted under the act to deal with the decision of the PIO if the seeker of information is aggrieved by decision of PIO. Thus any order passed by FAA, either confirming the decision of PIO or reversing it, is a quasi judicial order. Aggrieved party can challenge the order of FAA before Commission. The duty cast on FAA under the act is only to pass an appropriate order. The validity of such order is to be decided by Commission in second appeal, if filed. FAA is thus not required to defend its order before higher forum.

c) While dealing with the scope of the orders passed by the Commission in second appeal the Karnataka High Court had dismissed a Writ Appeal filed by Karnataka Information Commission holding that Commission is not an aggrieved person. The said order of High Court of Karnataka was challenged before the Hon'ble

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Supreme Court in a special leave Petition. By dismissing the said petition by imposing cost of Rs.100000/- on the Karnataka State Information Commission, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed.

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What has surprised us in that while the writ appeal was filed by the Commission, the special leave petition has been preferred by the Karnataka Information Commissioner. Learned counsel could not explain as to how the petitioner herein, who was not an appellant before the Division Bench of the High Court can challenge the impugned order. He also could not explain as to what was the locus of the Commission to file appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge whereby its order has been set aside.

The entire exercise undertaken by the Commission and the Karnataka Information Commissioner to challenge the orders of the learned Single Judge and the division Bench of the High Court shows that the concerned officers have wasted public money for satisfying their ego. If respondent No.2 felt aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, nothing

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prevented him from challenging the same by filing writ appeal. However, the fact of the matter is that he did not question the order of the learned Single Judge. The Commission and the Karnataka Information Commissioner had no legitimate cause to challenge the order passed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court. Therefore, the writ appeal filed by the commission was totally unwarranted and misconceived and the Division Bench of the High Court did not commit any error by dismissing the same. [Supreme Court of India, Petition for Special leave to Appeal(Civil).../2013 CC 1853/2013)

The rationale which has been discussed therein is the locus of the State Commission which is the second Appellate Authority under the Act. The same principle also applies to the FAA vis a vis the second appellate Authority i.e. the State Information Commissions.

Considering the above view of the Hon'ble Apex Court, I am unable to accept the contention of FAA that it has a locus to defend its order. Being a quasi judicial authority, its order is subject to scrutiny of the appellate Authority and not required to be defended.

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d) Notwithstanding the locus of the FAA, as the PIO has also raised the same defense the grounds raised by FAA are also dealt with in the present appeal.

e) Perused the records and considered the rival contentions of the parties. Though the appellant has stated in the memo of appeal that on 19/04/2018 the request for information was rejected on the ground that the legal opinion sought is exempted from disclosure u/s 8(1)(e) of the act, no copy of such reply is filed on record. However on the bases of the order, dated 14/06/2018, passed by F.A.A., wherein the said decision of the PIO dated 19/04/2018 is reproduced, it is seen that the same is rejected on the ground that legal opinion sought is exempted from disclosure u/s 8 (1) (e) of the act with a contention that the information is held in fiduciary relationship. The said reply is based on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.7571 of 2011 (*The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India V/s Shaunak H Satya & others*)

f) Considering the sole ground for refusal of information, it would be appropriate that the said provision of law is analysed. Section (8) (1) (e) of the act reads.

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“8. Exemption from disclosure of information.

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall be no obligation to give any citizen,___

(a) -----

(b) -----

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(d)-----

(e) information available to a person in this fiduciary relationship, unless the competent authority is satisfied that the larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information;

f)-----”

g) From the decision of the PIO vide her letter, dated 19/04/2018, the fiduciary relationship is claimed on the ground that the legal opinion is held by it in fiduciary relationship. In the course of submissions of the PIO it is contended that the said relationship exist in terms of section 126 of The Indian Evidence Act 1872. According to her the said legal opinion is obtained from a legal practitioner and hence it is a privileged communication which cannot be accessed in view of the bar under section 126 of Indian evidence Act.

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h) In view of the said plea, for considering the same it is necessary that the relevant provisions of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 are analysed. Said section 126 reads:

*“**126:** No barrister, attorney, pleader or vakil shall at any time be permitted, unless with his **client’s express consent**, to disclose any communication made to him in the course and for the purpose of his employment as such barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil, by or on behalf of his client, or to state the contents or condition of any document with which he has become acquainted in the course and for the purpose of his professional employment, or to disclose any advice given by him to his client in the course and for the purpose of such employment:*

Provided that nothing in this section shall protect from disclosure:—

(1) Any such communication made in furtherance of any illegal purpose;

(2)

(emphasis supplied)

i) On reading of above provision it can be gathered that the privilege granted under aforesaid section is not absolute. The Communication so made can be furnished if consented by the client. The said section also

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carves out an exception that such a privilege is not applicable if such communication is made for illegal purpose.

j) According to Adv. Gode for the appellant, even otherwise the said section 126 is not applicable in the present case as it refers to the privileged communication held under fiduciary relationship. According to her the information is not sought from such fiduciary but from beneficiary i.e. GSPCB, which is a public Authority

k) In the present case the appellant has sought the copy of the legal opinion which is in the records of GSPCB, which has obtained the same for taking a decision on some public issue. In such situation, in the background of the overriding effect as contained in section 22 of the act, such communication would be governed by section 129 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872, which reads:

*“129. Confidential communications with legal advisers.—No one **shall be compelled to disclose** to the Court any confidential communication which has taken place between him and his legal professional adviser, unless he offers himself as a witness, in which case he*

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may be compelled to disclose any such communications as may appear to the Court necessary to be known in order to explain any evidence which he has given, but no others.(emphasis supplied)

l) On careful analysis of the section 126 and section 129 it can be seen that the disclosure of privileged or confidential communication is also available to the third party but only with the consent of client. In these circumstances it would be necessary to determine whether the client, is justified in objecting the release of information, even if held to be privileged or confidential.

m) In the present case the legal opinion is held by GSPCB as a client and hence the option lies with GSPCB for its disclosure. Being so it is for GSPCB to justify the denial of information sought from it. This being the situation, the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in the case of Subhash Chandra Agarwal V/s Attorney General of India as relied upon by respondents would not be applicable to the present case. In the said case the seeker had sought declaration of the office of AG as a public Authority to access information from it. Contrary to the said facts in the present case the appellant has sought access of information already held by a public Authority.

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n) The respondents have relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of *Bihar Public service Commission V/s Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi and others*, with specific reference to para (22) in support of its contention that information held in fiduciary capacity cannot be furnished. Said para (22) reads:

“22. Section 8(1)(e) provides an exemption from furnishing of information, if the information available to a person is in his fiduciary relationship unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information. In terms of Section 8(1)(g), the public authority is not obliged to furnish any such information the disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement and security purposes. If the concerned public authority holds the information in fiduciary relationship, then the obligation to furnish information is obliterated. But if the competent authority is still satisfied that in the larger public interest, despite such objection, the information should be furnished, it may so direct the public authority. The term fiduciary refers to a person having a duty to

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act for the benefit of another, showing good faith and condor, where such other person reposes trust and special confidence in the person owing or discharging the duty. The term "fiduciary relationship" is used to describe a situation or transaction where one person places complete confidence in another person in regard to his affairs, business or transactions. This aspect has been discussed in some detail in the judgment of this Court in the case of Central Board of Secondary Education (supra). Section 8(1)(e), therefore, carves out a protection in favour of a person who possesses information in his fiduciary relationship. This protection can be negated by the competent authority where larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information, in which case, the authority is expected to record reasons for its satisfaction. Another very significant provision of the Act is 8(1)(j). In terms of this provision, information which relates to personal information, the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual would fall within the exempted category, unless the authority concerned is satisfied

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that larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information. It is, therefore, to be understood clearly that it is a statutory exemption which must operate as a rule and only in exceptional cases would disclosure be permitted, that too, for reasons to be recorded demonstrating satisfaction to the test of larger public interest. It will not be in consonance with the spirit of these provisions, if in a mechanical manner, directions are passed by the appropriate authority to disclose information which may be protected in terms of the above provisions. All information which has come to the notice of or on record of a person holding fiduciary relationship with another and but for such capacity, such information would not have been provided to that authority, would normally need to be protected and would not be open to disclosure keeping the higher standards of integrity and confidentiality of such relationship. Such exemption would be available to such authority or department.”

However the principles underlying said observations are further explained with reference to public Interest in paras (23) and (24) of therein which reads:

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“23. The expression □public interest has to be understood in its true connotation so as to give complete meaning to the relevant provisions of the Act. The expression public interest must be viewed in its strict sense with all its exceptions so as to justify denial of a statutory exemption in terms of the Act. In its common parlance, the expression public interest, like public purpose, is not capable of any precise definition . It does not have a rigid meaning, is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with time and state of society and its needs. [State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (AIR 1952 SC 252)]. **It also means the general welfare of the public that warrants recommendation and protection; something in which the public as a whole has a stake** [Black’s Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition)].

24. The satisfaction has to be arrived at by the authorities objectively and the consequences of such disclosure have to be weighed with regard to circumstances of a given case. **The decision has to be based on objective satisfaction recorded for ensuring that larger public interest**

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outweighs unwarranted invasion of privacy or other factors stated in the provision. Certain matters, particularly in relation to appointment, are required to be dealt with great confidentiality. The information may come to knowledge of the authority as a result of disclosure by others who give that information in confidence and with complete faith, integrity and fidelity. Secrecy of such information shall be maintained, thus, bringing it within the ambit of fiduciary capacity. Similarly, there may be cases where the disclosure has no relationship to any public activity or interest or it may even cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of the individual. All these protections have to be given their due implementation as they spring from statutory exemptions. It is not a decision simpliciter between private interest and public interest. **It is a matter where a constitutional protection is available to a person with regard to the right to privacy. Thus, the public interest has to be construed while keeping in mind the balance factor between right to privacy and right to information with the purpose sought to be achieved and the**

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purpose that would be served in the larger public interest, particularly when both these rights emerge from the constitutional values under the Constitution of India (emphasis supplied).

o) In the case of *Central board of Secondary Education & another V/s Aditya Bandopadhyay and others* as relied upon, by the respondent, as per para (44) thereof there is no obligation to give any citizen information available to a person in fiduciary relationship. It is further contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held therein that the fiduciary can withhold the information from third parties and can disclose only to beneficiary.

I am unable to accept said contentions. On careful consideration of the said judgment more particularly at para (41) thereof, Hon'ble Supreme Court has given illustrations as to whom the provisions of 8(1)(e) refers to. In said para (41) it is held:

“41. In a philosophical and very wide sense, examining bodies can be said to act in a fiduciary capacity, with reference to students who participate in an examination, as a government does while governing its citizens or as the present

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generation does with reference to the future generation while preserving the environment. **But the words ‘information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship’ are used in section 8(1)(e) of RTI Act in its normal and well recognized sense, that is to refer to persons who act in a fiduciary capacity, with reference to a specific beneficiary or beneficiaries who are to be expected to be protected or benefited by the actions of the fiduciary – a trustee with reference to the beneficiary of the trust, a guardian with reference to a minor /physically/ infirm/ mentally challenged, a parent with reference to a child, a lawyer or a chartered accountant with reference to a client, a doctor or nurse with reference to a patient, an agent with reference to a principal, a partner with reference to another partner, a director of a company with reference to a share-holder, an executor with reference to a legatee, a receiver with reference to the parties to a lis, an employer with reference to the confidential information relating to the employee, and an employee with reference to**

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business dealings/ transaction of the employer. We do not find that kind of fiduciary relationship between the examining body and the examinee, with reference to the evaluated answer-books, that come into the custody of the examining body.” (emphasis supplied)

p) Considering the said illustrations, it is apparent that though a lawyer or a chartered accountant act in fiduciary capacity to his client, there is no fiduciary relationship vice versa. Applying said ratio to the present case, I find that the GSPCB has no fiduciary relationship with the lawyer issuing the opinion. It is only the lawyer who has such relationship and can refuse disclosure, if not consented by client. The bar as contained u/s 126 or 129 of The Indian Evidence Act 1872 cannot be applied herein. The immunity from disclosure of information u/s 8(1) (e) therefore cannot be attracted herein.

q) The Act is envisaging to secure access to information under the control of public Authorities in order to promote transparency and accountability in working of public authority. Considering this aim, dissemination of information is in fact an opportunity to public Authority to show transparency and fairness in its working.

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Undisputedly GSPCB, the respondent Authority herein is a public authority. The information sought is the legal opinion, on bases of which a decision for revocation of show cause notices were issued. The notices were pertaining to decision related to environment clearances effecting public at large. Such a decision does involve a public interest and hence is subject to public scrutiny. Section (22) of the act overrides other acts in force for time being. Thus in larger public interest, the respondent public Authority i.e. GSPCB is left with no option than to disclose the same.

r) Considering above principles to the case in hand I find no grounds to justify the refusal of information by the respondent Authority. As the information pertains to a public activity and also involving public interest and which information is under the control and custody of said authority, the information sought cannot be said to be held in fiduciary capacity to invoke exemption u/s 8(1)(e) of the act. Thus the decision of the PIO, refusing information by taking shelter of section 8(1)(e) was unwarranted and misconceived.

s) I have perused the order, dated 14/06/2018 passed by the FAA. The said order is apparently based on erroneous interpretation of the cases referred therein and without distinguishing the

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facts herein. The FAA has erroneously applied the ratio in the case of *Union of India V/s Subhash Chandra Agarwal*. In the said case the issue was whether the office of AGI is a public Authority, for the purpose of seeking information under the act. In the present case the information which is sought is undisputedly from a Public Authority. The issue before FAA was only whether withholding of the information was justified or not in public interest. On considering the findings in the said order of FAA, I find that the same was passed mechanically and without considering the larger public interest involved and the overriding effect of the act. The said order thus is required to be set aside.

t) In the facts and circumstances as discussed above, I find that the information as sought by the appellant is not held under any fiduciary relationship. The same relates to a public activity and involving larger public interest. The exemption u/s 8 (1)(e) of the act thus cannot be applied herein. I therefore find merits in the appeal and consequently the present appeal is disposed with the following:

ORDER

The appeal is allowed. The order of FAA dated 14/06/2018 in Right to Information Appeal

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No.5/2018, is set aside. Consequently decision of PIO dated 19/04/2018 is also set aside. The PIO is hereby directed to furnish to the appellant the information as sought by him vide his application dated 16/04/2018, free of cost. Within FIFTEEN DAYS from the date of receipt of the order by it.

Considering the peculiar circumstances of the case I find no grounds to invoke the rights conferred to this Commission u/s 20(1) and/or 20(2) of the Act.

Order be communicated to parties alongwith a copy thereof free of cost.

Proceedings closed.

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(Shri. P. S.P. Tendolkar)
Chief Information Commissioner
Goa State Information Commission
Panaji -Goa